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UNDERSTANDING MERRELL DOW: FEDERAL
QUESTION JURISDICTION FOR STATE-
FEDERAL HYBRID CASES
What is surprising is the continuing belief that there is, or should be, a
single, all-purpose, neutral analytical concept which marks out federal
question jurisdiction.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A clear and consistent definition of the scope of federal question jurisdiction
has eluded both commentators and the Supreme Court for as long as the
statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction has existed.2 While s veral
theories have been proposed, the Court has yet to agree on a unifying principle.3
Instead, the Court, perhaps wisely, recognizes different theories at different
times in a manner that gives the Court the flexibility to effectively regulate the
federal docket.4
The Supreme Court’s last major decision on federal question jurisdiction,
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,5 reiterates many of these
theories, but at the end concludes that:
a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a
state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be
no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”6
This apparently exclusive focus on the existence of a federal remedy in state-
1. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly” Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 907 (1967).
2. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 878-993 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Donald L. Doernberg,
There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the
Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601-11 (1987).
3. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
4. Indeed, in an early instance, Justice Cardozo recognized the need to define jurisdictional theory
in a more practical context. See infra note 24. The Court recently recognized the importance of federal
question jurisdiction decisions in the “proper management of the federal judicial system.” Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. at 8.
5. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
6. Id. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
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federal hybrid cases7 has led many lower federal courts to severely restrict
access to federal question jurisdiction.8 Moreover, the Court’s unprecedented
use of the implied remedy doctrine in analyzing the jurisdictional issue has led
commentators to criticize Merrell Dow’s reasoning.9
But Merrell Dow is not as restrictive as many courts and commentators
think. In fact, the reasoning in Merrell Dow appears largely to parallel portions
of Professor Cohen’s classic article on federal question jurisdiction, which
advocates a flexible, pragmatic approach.10 When Merrell Dow is read in
conjunction with both its statements of underlying jurisdiction principles and
Professor Cohen’s article, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a
Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law (“The Broken Compass”), a more
flexible approach for federal question jurisdiction emerges.11 Further more, a
comparative reading of Merrell Dow and The Broken Compass places the
Court’s use of the implied remedy doctrine in the context of this flexible,
pragmatic approach.12 In the meantime though, lower federal courts faced with
cases on the fringe of federal question jurisdiction, especially state-federal
hybrid cases, have struggled to identify a single workable test.13 Courts have
even more difficulty when faced with these issues in the context of removal
jurisdiction.14
This Note argues that a proper understanding of Merrell Dow does not limit
federal question jurisdiction to only those cases alleging a federal cause of
action. Instead, Merrell Dow articulates a pragmatic test for federal question
jurisdiction in which a federal remedy is just one factor. To focus the discussion,
7. The term “state-federal hybrid case” is used in this Note to refer to cases in which the well-
pleaded complaint states a cause of action requiring resolution of both state and federal law issues.
8. See Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine
After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1532-38 (1991); see also cases cited infra note 45.
9. See Alleva, supra note 8, at 1543-51; Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial
Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles,” 78
VA. L. REV. 1769, 1790-91 (1992).
10. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 910-12.
11. See infra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
13. The lower courts have difficulty assessing the appropriate test. See Alleva, supra note 8, at
1532-38. For conflicts over the appropriate test for federal question jurisdiction in complete preemption
cases, see Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process Perspective, 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927, 964-83 (1996).
14. See Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV.
717 (1986). Federal question jurisdiction is especially difficult in the removal context because plaintiffs
frequently attempt to bury federal issues and defendants go to great lengths to spot them. See Lynn C.
Tyler, Federal Question Jurisdiction: How Plaintiffs Can Avoid Inadvertently Alleging It and How
Defendants Can Spot It Where It May Not Be Obvious, 37 RES GESTAE 566 (1994).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/6
p219 note Marshall.doc 05/20/99   11:56 AM
1999] UNDERSTANDING MERRELL DOW 221
this Note analyzes three recent circuit court decisions faced with the same issue:
whether federal question removal jurisdiction exists for state law insurance
claims seeking coverage under federal employee health insurance contracts.
These federal insurance removal cases present an example of the confusion in
the lower courts over federal question jurisdiction and provide a framework for
applying an understanding of Merrell Dow to state-federal hybrid cases.
Part II of this Note outlines the major Supreme Court decisions on federal
question jurisdiction. Part III discusses the federal insurance removal cases in
light of this outline. Part IV compares the reasoning of Merrell Dow to The
Broken Compass and describes a less restrictive understanding of Merrell Dow.
Finally, Part V applies this understanding of Merrell Dow to the federal
insurance removal cases.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR FEDERAL
QUESTION REMOVAL JURISDICTION
Civil actions brought in state court that “arise under” federal law for the
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 133115 can be removed to federal court by the
defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.16 While the statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction has traditionally been interpreted more narrowly than the
constitutional grant17 of judicial power, the precise bounds of the statutory grant
15. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
16. Section 1441 provides among other things:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of removal under this chapter, the
citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right
arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to
the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the
parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
17. Article III, section 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The constitutional grant of judicial power to decide federal question
jurisdiction generally is thought to be quite broad. Chief Justice John Marshall claimed that the
constitutional power extended to every case in which there was a federal “ingredient.” Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). For a discussion of modern Supreme Court
interpretation of Article III, Section 2, see The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—II. Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure, 97 HARV. L. REV. 208 (1983).
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remain elusive.18
In attempts to mark these bounds, courts and commentators have formulated
several tests.19 Justice Holmes’ famous formulation that “[a] suit arises under
the law that creates the cause of action,”20 is “useful for describing the vast
majority of cases that come within the district courts’ original jurisdiction.”21 In
18. The reason for the difference between the breadth of the constitutional grant and the breadth of
the statutory grant is not immediately obvious. A comparison of the language of section 1331, see supra
note 15, and Article III, section 2, see supra note 17, of the Constitution reveals no significant difference.
In fact, some scholars believe that the 1875 Act, which originally conferred statutory federal question
jurisdiction, was actually intended to give the courts the full extent of the constitutional grant of judicial
power. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65-69
(1928); James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L.
REV. 639 (1942); Ray Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question,” 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 375 (1942)
(quoting Sen. Matthew H. Carpenter, the Act’s primary draftsman, as saying, “This bill gives precisely the
power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing less.” (emphasis omitted)). But as Professor
Cohen noted, such a broad interpretation of the statutory grant would have been extremely impractical.
“Such an interpretation would make those courts substantially courts of general jurisdiction, since large
numbers of law suits could be said to depend potentially on relevant issues of federal law.” Cohen, supra
note 1, at 891. For a discussion of this dichotomy, see Doernberg, supra note 2, at 601-11.
The recognition that a coextensive interpretation of the statutory and constitutional grants would be
impractical arguably led the Court to interpret the statutory doctrine as it would a common-law doctrine.
Under such a view, the Court’s understanding of the statutory grant is overtly nonoriginalist and evolves
in light of experience and new developments. See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme
Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The
Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1100 &
n.109 (1992). There is a rich literature on the legitimacy of this common-law approach to the regulation
of federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits
of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985); Gene R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics—A Half Measure of
Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. REV. 767.
On the other hand, at the time of the 1875 Act, there was a textual hook for a narrow construction of
the statutory grant. Section 5 of the Act directed the federal court to dismiss or remand if it appeared at
any time “that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
[its] jurisdiction.” Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472. Indeed, the first Supreme Court
case to interpret federal question jurisdiction under the 1875 Act relied on section 5 to affirm the remand
of a state cause of action for which there was a possible federal defense. See Gold-Washing & Water Co.
v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203 (1877). See generally Chadbourn & Levin, supra, at 649-50. Section 5 was
eliminated as “unnecessary” in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994)
(Historical and Revision Notes).
19. See sources cited supra notes 2-3, 10.
20. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Although this
test is universally attributed to Justice Holmes, it can be traced as far back as Justice Matthews’ opinion in
Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 423-24 (1883).
21. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983). The test
almost completely breaks down, however, in those cases presenting mixed questions of state and federal
law. “What appears to be a self-applying analytical standard breaks down because it fails to supply an
analytical definition which will determine whether plaintiff’s claim is a federal cause of action
incorporating state law, or a state cause of action incorporating federal law.” Cohen, supra note 1, at 898.
One could argue, though, that this defect has largely been corrected with the advent of modern implied
remedy doctrine. Under the prevailing doctrine, there appears to be a presumption that state law creates the
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rare circumstances, however, the Holmes’ analysis fails as an inclusionary
principle.22 For example, a federal cause of action that raises mostly state law
issues with little or no federal law issues of any significance may not obtain
jurisdiction.23 Furthermore, the Holmes’ analysis has generally been “rejected as
an exclusionary principle.”24
The most significant exclusionary principle to emerge as a test for federal
question jurisdiction is the “well-pleaded complaint” rule.25 U de  this rule, an
action arises under federal law only if federal law appears in the plaintiff’s own
well-pleaded complaint.26 Additionally, the federal law must not appear as a
defense or in anticipation of a defense.27
Despite its prominence as an exclusionary principle, the well-pleaded
complaint rule is not without exception. In the case of removal jurisdiction, a
“plaintiff may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal
cause of action, absent an explicit indication of congressional intent to create a federal remedy. See infra
note 40.
22. See Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505
(1900).
23. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9.
24. Id. (citing Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 270-72 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.)). Justice Cardozo recognized the
need to view the Holmes’ formulation in context:
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the attempt to define a “cause of action”
without reference to the context. To define broadly and in the abstract “a case arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States” has hazards of a kindred order. What is needed is something of
that common-sense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterize the law
in its treatment of causation. . . . To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and
those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936) (citations omitted).
25. Commentators generally trace this rule back to Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S.
454 (1894), although the most famous description of the rule is contained in Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (holding that an assertion of federal law in anticipation of a
defense is not sufficient for federal question jurisdiction).
It is the settled interpretation of these words, as used in this statute, conferring jurisdiction, that a suit
arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his own
cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.
Id. at 152. For a criticism of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Doernberg, supra note 2.
26. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. For a discussion of strategic pleading concerns, see Tyler, supra
note 14.
27. See Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. Professor Collins argues that this construction of the 1887
amendments to the 1875 statute which tied removal to the well-pleaded complaint rule is fundamentally
flawed and contrary to the Framers’ intent. See Collins, supra note 14. But as Professor Redish says, “It
often seems irrelevant that something is being done incorrectly, as long as it has been done incorrectly long
enough.” Redish, supra note 9, at 1769. He describes this as a theory of legal process “adverse
possession.” Id.
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questions in a complaint.”28 In rare circumstances, such “artful pleading”29
occurs when a plaintiff pleads a state cause of action that has been “completely
preempted” by a federal cause of action such that “any complaint that comes
within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily ‘arises under’ federal
law.”30
The well-pleaded complaint rule does not only fail as an exclusionary
principle as in the case of complete preemption; on occasion, it also fails as an
inclusionary principle. State-federal hybrid cases, those cases in which a “well-
pleaded complaint establish[es] that its right to relief under state law requires
resolution of a substantial question of federal law in dispute between the
parties,” create additional problems for the well-pleaded complaint rule.31
28. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22. The intentional omission of necessary federal questions in a
complaint is euphemistically referred to as “artful pleading.” See Robert A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the
Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 273 (1993). For a discussion of artful pleading techniques,
see Tyler, supra note 14.
29. See supra note 28.
30. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 24. The Supreme Court recognizes only two completely
preemptive federal statutes: section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1994), and section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (1994). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 230 (5th ed. 1994).
The complete preemption doctrine has its origin in cases interpreting the LMRA. Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), held that the “substantive law to apply in suits under §
301(a) is federal law.” Id. at 456. In fashioning appropriate federal law, federal courts must look to the
“policy of our national labor laws,” but can resort to state law if necessary. Id. at 456-57. But “any state
law applied . . . will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.”
Id. at 457.
In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Court built on its construction of
section 301 of the LMRA to find that any action to enforce a collective bargaining agreement necessarily
arises under section 301 of the LMRA and therefore, must arise under federal law. Whether the Court
recognized that the decision in Avco effectively created an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
unclear. In any case, the Court acknowledged in subsequent cases that Avco creates such an exception.
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 23-24.
The narrowness of the complete preemption exception is illustrated in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987). In Taylor the Court found that a state claim for employee benefits was
preempted by ERISA and also fell within the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) of ERISA.
But “federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiff’s suit.” Id. at 63. Without explicit
direction from Congress, the Court was “reluctant to find that extraordinary pre-emptive power . . . that
converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-
pleaded complaint rule.” Id. at 65. The Court found the necessary direction from Congress in section
502(f), which granted federal jurisdiction “to grant the relief provided for in [section 502(a)] in any
action.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f). Furthermore, legislative history indicated congressional intent to allow such
jurisdiction in a manner consistent with section 301 of the LMRA, that is, to allow complete preemption.
See Taylor, 481 U.S. at 65-66.
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Taylor highlighted the importance of this particular direction from
Congress. See id. at 67. Removal jurisdiction should not be found merely upon a finding of congressional
intent to preempt state law. See id. Instead, Congress must “clearly manifest[] an intent to make causes of
action . . . removable to federal court.” Id. at 68.
31. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13. Cases of this type pose what Justice Frankfurter called the
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The jurisdiction problem of state-federal hybrid cases is highlighted by the
apparent conflict between the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co.32 and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson.33 Both cases involved a well-pleaded state cause of action, an
element of which required proof of a violation of federal law. But Smith upheld
jurisdiction,34 while Merrell Dow did not.35
In Smith shareholders of a state bank brought an action to enjoin the bank
from investing in certain federal bonds.36 Arguing that the federal statute
authorizing issuance of the bonds was unconstitutional, the shareholders
claimed a right to relief under state law on the basis that state law prohibited the
bank from investing in bonds not issued pursuant to a valid law.37 Although
federal law did not create the cause of action and the violation of federal law
was essentially only an element of the state cause of action, the Court upheld
jurisdiction on the theory that the plaintiff’s right to relief “depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”38
“litigation-provoking problem.” Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter
viewed jurisdiction in these cases as dependent on the “degree to which federal law must be in the
forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral or remote.” Id.
32. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
33. 478 U.S. 804 (1986). For discussion and critique of Merrell Dow, see Alleva, supra note 8;
William V. Luneberg, Nonoriginalist Interpretation—A Comment on Federal Question Jurisdiction
and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1987); Redish, supra note 9,
at 1787-94. Luneberg points out that the Court’s opinion in Merrell Dow does not depend exclusively on
typical originalist statutory interpretation of section 1331, that is, the Court looks beyond original intent in
interpreting section 1331. See id.; see also supra note 18. Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of
section 1331 takes into account practical and judicial policy considerations. “We have consistently
emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction
require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.” Merrell
Dow, 478 U.S. at 810. Luneburg interprets this statement to mean that “construction of section 1331 will
not turn solely on divination of the original intent of that provision but on developments which occurred
after its enactment.” Luneburg, supra, at 761. Luneburg concludes that the majority’s decision in Merrell
Dow is attributable to two practical considerations: a pragmatic determination of whether federal
adjudication or federal appellate review is the most efficient method of protecting the federal interest at
stake and the concern that state claim incorporation of federal standards would significantly threaten the
already burdened federal docket. See id. at 766-70. Luneburg finally hypothesizes that Merrell Dow may
ultimately represent a move toward requiring Congress to clearly state an intent to grant federal
jurisdiction before the Court will sanction its exercise. See id. at 770-71.
34. See Smith, 255 U.S. at 202.
35. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817.
36. 255 U.S. at 195.
37. See id. at 197-98.
38. Id. at 199. Hart and Wechsler put the holding more starkly: “Thus state law supplied both the
claimed right and the claimed remedy. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction on the ground
that ‘the controversy concerns the constitutional validity of an act of Congress, which is directly drawn in
question.’” HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 926. Justice Holmes dissented, based in part on his test
for jurisdiction from American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). See Smith,
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In contrast, the Court in Merrell Dow rejected jurisdiction over a state tort
action alleging that a violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)
constituted per se negligence.39 Bas d on the assumption that no federal cause of
action exists for FDCA violations,40 the Court found that the “congressional
determination that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this
federal statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a
claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is
insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”41
The Court’s expansive language at the end of its opinion causes broader
concern for the Smith analysis.42 The Court’s seemingly exclusive focus on the
255 U.S. at 214.
39. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805-06. The Court stated:
In Count IV, respondents alleged that the drug Bendectin was “misbranded” in violation of the [FDCA]
because its labeling did not provide adequate warning that its use was potentially dangerous. Paragraph
26 alleged that the violation of the FDCA “in the promotion” of Bendectin “constitutes a rebuttable
presumption of negligence.” Paragraph 27 alleged that the “violation of said federal statutes directly and
proximately cause the injuries suffered” by the two infants.
Id. (citations omitted).
40.  See id. at 810. Given the ultimate importance of this assumption to the decision in the case, one
wonders why the Court would simply make the assumption without any discussion: “In this case, both
parties agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that there is no federal cause of action for FDCA
violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume that this is a correct interpretation of the FDCA.” Id.
The Court took this assumption and worked backwards through the implied cause of action test of Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Court stated:
Thus, as the case comes to us, it is appropriate to assume that, under the settled framework for evaluating
whether a federal cause of action lies, some combination of the following factors is present: (1) the
plaintiffs are not part of the class for whose special benefit the statute was passed; (2) the indicia of
legislative intent reveal no congressional purpose to provide a private cause of action; (3) a federal cause
of action would not further the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) the respondents’
cause of action is a subject traditionally relegated to state law. In short, Congress did not intend a private
federal remedy for violations of the statute that it enacted.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810-11 (footnote omitted). The assumption that some combination of the Cort
factors existed led directly to the conclusion that Congress did not intend a private federal remedy. This
reasoning, though not analytically persuasive, is consistent with post-Cort case law essentially recognizing
that congressional intent is the central inquiry in determining the existence of private federal remedies.
See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). While the ultimate conclusion that Congress did not
intend a private federal remedy may be supportable, this method of reasoning is troubling in light of the
Court’s observation that a “more careful scrutiny of legislative intent . . . should inform the concern for
practicality and necessity” in the construction of section 1331. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811 (quotations
& citations omitted). The Court’s backward reasoning from an assumption about the absence of a private
federal remedy to an assumption about the absence of congressional intent to create such a remedy does
not constitute a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent.
41. Id. at 814. The final inquiry in Merrell Dow is whether Congress intended to create federal
jurisdiction. In this case, the Court uses its assumption that Congress did not intend to create a private
federal remedy to infer that Congress intended to foreclose federal jurisdiction.
42. The Court stated its holding:
We conclude that a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of
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lack of a federal remedy has led many courts and commentators to conclude that
the Court has abandoned Smith and with it, all practical discretion over the
bounds of federal question jurisdiction.43 Indeed, the predominant interpretation
of Merrell Dow seems to be that the Court will now only recognize federal
question jurisdiction under the Holmes’ formulation.44
III. THE FEDERAL INSURANCE REMOVAL CASES
Since Merrell Dow, confusion over the scope of federal question jurisdiction
has plagued the lower courts. Their approach to federal question jurisdiction
over state-federal hybrid cases is especially confused. Some courts rely solely on
Holmes’ narrow formulation of jurisdiction;45 o hers apply a more flexible
action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the
violation, does not state a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). Compare this to the Court’s statement
of the question presented:
The question presented is whether the incorporation of a federal standard in a state-law private action,
when Congress has intended that there not be a federal private action for violations of that federal
standard, makes the action one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Id. at 805 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
43. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1988); Rogers v. Platt, 814
F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Utley v. Varian Assocs., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987); Alleva,
supra note 8, at 1521-31.
44. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 273 (2d ed. 1994) (“Therefore,
without a federal cause of action, a federal law cannot be the basis for federal question jurisdiction.”);
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 461 (2d ed. 1989) (“What is left of Smith after Merrell Dow?”);
Friedman, supra note 18, at 24 (stating Merrell Dow held that “federal ingredient in a state cause of
action” cases should not be heard in lower federal courts); David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to “Reassessing the
Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1842 n.17
(1992) (“But the Court in Merrell Dow appears to have made the absence of a private, federal cause of
action entirely determinative of the jurisdictional issue.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights
and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1146 n.267 (1992) (asserting that Merrell Dow
establishes “that federal jurisdiction may not exist under that statute if the federal law establishing the
primary right is not enforceable through a federal right of action”); Marianne Auld, Note, Merrell Dow
Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Thompson: Limitations on Federal Question Jurisdiction, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
543, 560 (1987) (“Under [a literal interpretation of Merrell Dow] a court faced with the question of
whether federal jurisdiction exists would do no more than determine whether federal or state law creates
the plaintiff’s cause of action.”); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases: II. Federal
Jurisdiction and Procedure, 100 HARV. L. REV. 230, 236 (1986) (“Here the Court may have gone too
far; indeed, it may have transformed the federal question jurisdictional prerequisite into a requirement of
the existence of a federal remedy rather than the presence of an important federal issue—at least insofar as
a private litigant relies on violation of a federal statute.”).
45. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“Therefore, under Merrell Dow, if a federal law does not provide a private right of action, a state law
action based on its violation does not raise a ‘substantial’ federal question.”); Smith v. Industrial Valley
Title Ins. Co., 957 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Following Merrell Dow, we hold that a private federal
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approach;46 and still others approach the issue haphazardly.47 The federal
insurance removal cases exemplify this confusion.
Like most large organizations, the federal government provides health
insurance for its employees.48 This coverage, authorized under the Federal
Employee Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”),49 is the result of contracts between
the Federal Government and health insurance carriers.50 Cong ess enacted the
FEHBA to provide employees financial protection against both common and
catastrophic health problems.51 A federal agency, the Office of Personnel
Management (“OPM”), ensures employees such financial protection by
remedy for violating a federal statute is a prerequisite for finding federal question jurisdiction in this
circumstance.”); Dillon v. Combs, 895 F.2d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (“A federal rule of decision is
necessary but not sufficient for federal jurisdiction. There must also be a right of action to enforce that
rule.”); Rogers, 814 F.2d at 688 (stating, in dicta, that it is not “necessary for federal courts to consider
whether a substantial federal question is a necessary element of a state cause of action because
congressional intent not to create a federal cause of action is deemed a proxy for the ultimate question
whether or not Congress intended to confer federal jurisdiction”); Utley, 811 F.2d at 1284 (“Only if the
[affirmative action] executive order provides . . . a private right of action . . . in federal court might his
complaint raise a ‘substantial’ federal question permitting removal jurisdiction.”).
46. See, e.g., City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24 F.3d 169, 174 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We
conclude that it will be only the exceptional federal statute that does not provide for a private remedy but
still raises a federal question substantial enough to confer federal question jurisdiction when it is an
element of a state cause of action.”); West 14th St. Commercial Corp. v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815
F.2d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1987) (“To determine whether the court has federal question jurisdiction to decide
the case, the complaint must contain either a federal cause of action or a state cause of action embodying a
substantial federal question.”).
47. See, e.g., Milan Express Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 886 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
federal question jurisdiction is available for action seeking proceeds of surety bonds prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Act although the court seemingly failed to find federal cause of action under Act or
substantial federal question).
48. In 1959 Congress found a “wide gap” existed between the Government and private employers in
the provision of employee health benefits. H.R. REP. NO. 86-957, at 1 (1959), reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2913, 2914. While approximately seventeen million civilians participated in insurance
plans offering major medical insurance, “no more than a relative handful of Federal employees” had such
protection. Id. at 2. Congress responded by enacting the FEHBA to protect “civilian Government
employees against the high, unbudgetable, and, therefore, financially burdensome costs of medical service
through a comprehensive Government-wide program of insurance.” Id. at 1. The costs of the new
insurance plans were to be shared equally between the Government and its employees. See id.
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (1994).
50. To provide employees with health insurance, the Federal Government negotiates and executes
insurance contracts with private health insurance carries such as Blue Cross & Blue Shield. See id. §
8902. Federal employees then enroll in an insurance plan with a carrier of their choice subject to the terms
of the insurance contract. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.101 (1998). Federal employees are not parties to the
contracts but are considered enrollees or third-party beneficiaries. See id.
51. The FEHBA intended to provide “a wide range of hospital, surgical, medical, and related
benefits designed to afford the employees full or substantially full protection against expenses of both
common and catastrophic illness or injury.” H.R. REP. NO. 86-957, at 1 (1959), reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2913.
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negotiating and executing the contracts.52 Despite the OPM’s efforts, federal
employees, like other insureds, occasionally demand medical procedures for
which the insurance carriers are reluctant to pay. Sometimes, and especially
when the employee faces a terminal disease for which the only hope may lie in
experimental medical procedures, these coverage disputes result in lawsuits.53
Federal employees routinely file these suits against the insurance carriers in
state courts.54 Indeed, insurance coverage disputes are usually brought as
contract or tort actions and are normally the province of exclusive state
jurisdiction. But when the insured is an employee of the Federal Government
and the Government is a party to an insurance contract subject to the provisions
of the FEHBA, the cases are no longer based exclusively on state law. In fact,
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902. Originally, the administrative authority was vested in the U.S. Civil
Service Commission. In 1978 Congress amended the FEHBA to vest the OPM with such authority. See
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 906(a), 92 Stat. 1111, 1224-25.
53. Health insurance coverage disputes have a rich history. But the increasing reliance on high
technology in medicine coupled with the advent of managed care have raised the stakes significantly. See
generally Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of
Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055 (1996); Helene L. Parise, Comment, The
Proper Extension of Tort Liability Principles in the Managed Care Industry, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 977
(1991); Richard S. Saver, Note, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts Judging
Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (1992). For discussion of some current conflicts, see
Barbara A. Fisfis, Comment, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical Treatment Necessarily
Incurred Should Be Excluded from Coverage Under a Health Insurance Policy Provision Which
Excludes from Coverage “Experimental” Medical Treatments?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 777 (1993). See also
Jennifer Barber, Note, Experimental Treatment Exclusions from Medical Insurance Coverage: Who
Should Decide?, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 389 (1996).
54. At the time of the circuit courts’ decisions on federal question removal jurisdiction of FEHB
contract claims, OPM regulations provided that “litigation to recover on the claim should be brought
against the carrier, not against OPM.” 5 C.F.R. § 890.107 (1994). After the decisions, the OPM amended
the FEHBA regulations with respect to actions for the recovery of benefits. See 5 C.F.R. § 890.107(c)
(1998). The regulations now provide that “[a] legal action to review final action by OPM involving such
denial of health benefits must be brought against OPM and not against the carrier or carrier’s
subcontractors.” Id.
This new regulation may change the jurisdictional analysis for these cases because the FEHBA
provides for federal jurisdiction over any “civil action or claim against the United States founded on this
chapter.” 5 U.S.C. § 8912 (1994). Nevertheless, federal employees continue to bring coverage claims
against insurance carriers, and some federal courts continue to remand removed actions to state court. See
Arnold v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 973 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys.,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534 (D.N.M. 1996); Santitoro v. Evans, 935 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Sarkis v.
Heimburger, 933 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Mo. 1996). But see Hanson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 953 F.
Supp. 270 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
FEHB contract claims in state courts continue largely because the OPM has limited “[t]he recovery in
such a suit [against the OPM] to a court order directing OPM to require the carrier to pay the amount of
benefits in dispute.” 5 C.F.R. § 890.107(c) (1998). Therefore, plaintiffs argue that they are not bringing
“[a] legal action to review final action by OPM,” id., but are bringing tort or contract actions seeking
more extensive damages. See cases cited supra. For the purposes of this Note, however, the insurance
decisions serve only as a framework for the discussion of Merrell Dow’s effect on state-federal hybrid
claims. Therefore, this Note ignores the effect of the amendment on the jurisdictional analysis.
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the FEHBA specifically provides that the provisions of FEHB contracts “which
relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits . . . shall supercede and
preempt any State or local law.”55 Instead, they are state-federal hybrid cases,
possibly subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.56
When faced with an action brought in state court by an insured federal
employee alleging unlawful denial of health insurance coverage, insurers have
good strategic reasons to remove the action to federal court including:
expectations of less hostility toward business litigants;57 a perception that
55. 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m) (1994). In the mid-1970s, federal officials became increasingly concerned
about conflicts between state law and FEHB contracts in coverage disputes between federal employees and
FEHB insurance carriers. See S. REP. NO. 95-903, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413,
1414. The Senate was primarily concerned with state laws that imposed requirements on health insurance
plans and the actions of state officials in attempting to enforce those requirements on FEHB contracts:
Some States have established health insurance requirements that conflict with the provisions of the FEHB
contracts, such as requiring recognition of certain practitioners not covered by Federal employee’s health
benefits plans. Many States have not attempted to enforce their requirements that conflict with the FEHB
plans. In other States, the carriers have been successful in convincing the States that the Federal
employees’ plans are exempt from State requirements. Other States have enforced their requirements but
have not done so uniformly for all carriers in the Federal program.
Id. In particular, states were “becoming increasingly active in establishing and enforcing health insurance
requirements,” and “confusion exist[ed] . . . regarding the applicability of state requirements to FEHB
contracts.” Id. (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE HEALTH INSURANCE
REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFITS CARRIERS (1975)).
At the time, the Comptroller General thought that the FEHBA already preempted state laws related to
health benefits. See id. Despite those indications, Congress chose to amend the FEHBA to avoid “time
consuming and costly litigation” thought to be necessary to establish such preemption. Id. The purpose of
the amendment was “to establish uniformity in Federal employee health benefits and coverage.” Id. at 1.
But the preemption was “purposely limited” and was not intended to “provide insurance carriers under the
program with exemptions from State laws and regulations governing other aspects of the insurance
business.” Id. at 4. State requirements that the Committee did not intend to preempt included the payment
of premium taxes and requirements for statutory reserves. See id. Although the preemption clause was
purposely limited, it was intended to clarify any confusion concerning the Commission’s “authority to
issue regulations restricting the application of State laws when their provisions do not parallel the
provisions in the Commission’s health benefits contracts.” Id. The legislative history essentially seems
consistent with the plain language of the preemption clause. The Committee only seemed to envision the
preemption of state laws which “relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits.” 5 U.S.C. §
8902(m).
56. This question could become especially important if Congress ever authorized a national health
care program. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on
American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1379 (1994).
57. In one recent study, 77.4% of defense attorneys who removed cases to federal court did so due to
fears of bias. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 399-400 (1992). Further, 44.8% specifically
cited the business or corporation status of their client as their reason for fearing bias. See id. at 408-09.
This expectation of less hostility toward corporate defendants in federal court appears to be primarily
based on an expectation of federal judges’ greater competence and willingness to check jury bias. See id.
at 424-25. Additionally, in some jurisdictions attorneys expect differences in the state and federal jury
pools will affect the amount of bias against corporate defendants. See id. at 425. This perception about
judicial competence is also strongly related to certain structural differences between federal and state
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federal judges are more competent than their state colleagues, especially in
matters involving the interpretation of federal law;58 and a desire for uniform
federal precedent that cuts across state borders.59 Given these powerful
incentives, the large body of district court law on FEHBA removal is not
surprising.60
Only three circuit courts have faced the issue,61 howev r, and each analyzed
courts. While federal courts’ independence is constitutionally protected, state judges usually serve limited
terms and must either seek reelection or reappointment. See Redish, supra note 9, at 1779-80.
58. While perceptions about judicial competence have a strong effect on the expectations of hostility,
see supra note 57, defense attorneys also note a greater availability of favorable rulings in federal court,
especially summary judgments. See Miller, supra note 57, at 425. More importantly, this belief is based
on the fact that federal judges are simply more experienced in the interpretation of federal law. This
experience will likely lead to more uniform results. Professor Cohen also noted an expectation that inferior
federal courts would be “more sympathetic to the enforcement of federal rights claimed by the plaintiff.
Potential antagonism in the state courts to the enforcement of the plaintiff’s federal right may adversely
color findings of fact as well as rulings on issues of law.” Cohen, supra note 1, at 893. Indeed, one
“reason Congress conferred original federal question jurisdiction on the [federal] courts was its belief that
state courts are hostile to assertions of federal rights.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804, 827 n.6 (1986); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 591 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed., 1864)
(“The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts, in cases in which the state tribunals cannot be
supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself.”); David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 328 (1978) (arguing that federal question jurisdiction rests upon “fear of state court
hostility to or misunderstanding of federal rights”). Of course, this logic applies equally to the enforcement
of a defendant’s federal rights.
59. Federal court decisions interpreting federal law have wide-ranging precedential value, especially
at the federal appellate levels. In contrast, state court decisions interpreting federal law have marginal
precedential value within the state and almost no value outside the state.
60. Several district courts have upheld federal jurisdiction over the FEHBA claims upon removal.
See Hanson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Mondor v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 895 F. Supp. 142 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Williams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 827 F. Supp.
1228 (E.D. Va. 1993); Roseberry v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 821 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Neb. 1993);
Lieberman v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 819 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Grazel v. Nazari,
Civ. A. No. 92-CV-1471, 1992 WL 122913 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1992); Woodson v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Civ. A. No. 91-923-A, 1992 WL 127482 (M.D. La. Apr. 22, 1992); Hirsch v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Civ. A. No. MJG-90-3049, 1991 WL 502004 (D. Md. Dec. 26, 1991); Ochsner Found. Hosp. v.
Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co., Civ. A. No. 88-5028, 1989 WL 6013 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 1989).
Other district courts have remanded the action back to state court. See Arnold v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 973 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Collins v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 949 F. Supp. 1143
(D.N.J. 1996); Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534 (D.N.M. 1996); Santitoro v.
Evans, 935 F. Supp. 733 (E.D.N.C. 1996); Sarkis v. Heimburger, 933 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Transitional Hosp. Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 924 F. Supp. 67 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Lambert v.
Mail Handler Benefit Plan, 886 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v.
Phillips, 835 F. Supp. 575 (D. Colo. 1993); Baptist Hosp. v. Timke, 832 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Craig v. Government Employees’ Ins. Co., 134 F.R.D. 126 (D. Md. 1991); Furey v. U.S. Healthcare
HMO, Civ. A. No. 91-1072, 1991 WL 206761 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1991).
61. This inconsistency exists largely because circuit courts generally lack the power to review
remand orders:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant
to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
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federal question removal jurisdiction in a significantly different manner. The
Tenth Circuit in Howard v. Group Hospital Service62 found that removal
jurisdiction does not exist because federal law does not apply to the
interpretation of FEHB contracts.63 The Fourth Circuit disagreed in Caudill v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield,64 finding that removal jurisdiction existed because
the interpretation of FEHB contracts is governed by federal common law that
displaces state law.65 Finally, the Third Circuit in Goepel v. National Postal
Mail Handlers Union66 found no removal jurisdiction because the FEHBA does
not create a federal cause of action against carriers and, therefore, does not
completely preempt state causes of action for denial of coverage.67 In an attempt
to resolve this circuit split, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
on the issue in 1995,68 however, the parties settled before oral argument.69
In Howard, the Tenth Circuit found that federal question jurisdiction did not
exist because federal law does not apply to the interpretation of FEHB
contracts.70 Federal law should govern a controversy involving private litigants
only when the “federal government has an articulable interest in the outcome of
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994). Section 1443 provides for the removal of civil rights cases. See id. § 1443.
The Supreme Court has allowed appellate review of remand orders issued for reasons other than lack of
jurisdiction or improvident removal. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
For criticism of section 1447(d), see Michael E. Solimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming Federal
Appellate Review, 58 MO. L. REV. 287 (1993). See also Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of
Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83 (1994).
62. 739 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1984).
63. See id. at 1512.
64. 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993).
65. See id. at 77.
66. 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
67. See id. at 313. The term “completely preempt” was first used by the Supreme Court in
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). For a discussion
of the complete preemption doctrine, see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
68. See Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Phillips, 835 F. Supp. 575 (D. Colo. 1993), aff’d,
28 F.3d 113, 1994 WL 315811 (10th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision), cert. granted, 513 U.S.
1071 (1995) (mem.), and cert. dismissed, 514 U.S. 1048 (1995) (mem.).
69. The writ of certiorari was dismissed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, see Rocky Mountain,
514 U.S. at 1048, which provides for dismissal upon agreement of the parties. See SUP. CT. R. 46. After
respondent’s brief was filed, the Solicitor General indicated support for the respondent’s position. The
insurer then settled the action. See Telephone Interview with Ronald J. Mann, Counsel for Respondent and
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (Nov. 12, 1997).
70. See Howard v. Group Hosp. Serv., 739 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1984). In Howard, a federal
employee brought a tort and contract action in Oklahoma state court arising from the FEHB carrier’s
failure to pay claims for treatment of his wife’s nervous and mental problems. The insurer removed the
action to federal court, which, in turn, denied the insured’s motion to remand. After trial and on appeal,
the Tenth Circuit vacated the trial court’s judgment for lack of federal question jurisdiction. See id. at
1508.
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a dispute.”71 For example, federal law would govern when “diverse resolutions
of a controversy would frustrate the operations of a federal program, conflict
with a specific national policy, or have some direct effect on the United States or
its treasury.”72
The majority found that no such interest existed because the OPM
regulations in effect at the time indicated that the Federal Government was not
concerned with the possible effect of state court judgments on the FEHB
contract.73 Furthermore, state court damages “do not have a sufficiently direct
effect on the federal treasury to necessitate federal jurisdiction.”74 Finally, the
court concluded that the claim “is a private controversy in which the federal
government simply does not have an interest sufficient to justify invoking
federal question jurisdiction.”75
Certainly the magnitude of the Federal Government’s interest is relevant to
whether federal common law should govern the interpretation of FEHB
contracts.76 But the Federal Government’s interest is only indirectly related to
the tests for federal question removal jurisdiction. Had the Tenth Circuit found
the federal interest sufficient to justify the application of federal common law to
the interpretation of FEHB contracts, the court still would have needed to decide
whether the action raised substantial issues of federal law or whether federal law
authorized a federal cause of action that completely preempts the state action.77
71. Id. at 1510. The court relied heavily on Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), in its
analysis of the applicability of federal common law. In Miree, victims of a plane crash brought a
complaint alleging that the local county had breached their contract with the Federal Aviation
Administration and, thereby, contributed to the crash. See id. at 26-27. The victims asserted that they were
third-party beneficiaries of the contracts and, therefore, had standing to sue under the federal common law.
See id. at 27. In finding that federal common law did not govern the claim, the Supreme Court found that
the application of state law would not have a “direct effect on the United States or its Treasury.” Id. at 29.
Furthermore, “any federal interest in the outcome of the question . . . ‘is far too speculative, far too remote
a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.’” Id. at
32-33 (quoting American Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956)).
72. Howard, 739 F.2d at 1510-11 (citing United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1967); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1968)) (footnote omitted).
73. See id. at 1511. This conclusion appears to be in direct conflict with the purpose and legislative
history behind the enactment of the FEHBA preemption clause. See supra note 55.
74. Howard, 739 F.2d at 1511.
75. Id. at 1512.
76. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-07 (1988); Miree, 433 U.S. at 29.
77. The magnitude of the Federal Government’s interest and the application of federal common law
is not relevant to the Holmes’ formulation for jurisdiction analysis. See supra notes 21-22, 31-44 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the application of federal common law is necessary but not sufficient for
federal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis is relevant to jurisdictional analysis under Smith and Merrell Dow. See
supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit’s finding that federal common law does not
govern the interpretation of FEHB contracts foreclosed further federal question
removal jurisdiction analysis. Without federal law to apply to FEHB contracts,
there simply could not be any federal issues in the case.
In Caudill,78 the Fourth Circuit analyzed the law governing the interpretation
of FEHB contracts in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Boyle
v. United Technology Corp.79 The court found that a conflict existed between a
uniquely federal interest and the application of state law to the interpretation of
FEHB contracts.80 First, there is a uniquely federal interest at stake in the
interpretation of FEHB contracts.81 The federal government is a party to the
contracts and the interpretation of these contracts affects “health benefits for
federal employees across the country.”82
Second, a significant conflict exists between those federal interests and the
application of state law.83 Application of state law liability would affect the
“government’s ability to enter into contracts [with health insurers,] the price
paid for such contracts[, and] would result in a patchwork quilt of benefits that
varied from state to state under the same contract because of the vast differences
in the common law of contracts from state to state.”84
Finally, the Fourth Circuit found the conflict to be so extensive that “in the
area of federal employee health benefits, federal common law entirely replaces
state contract law.”85 The court found such a conflict because application of
state law would “undermine the uniformity envisioned by Congress when it
78. 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993). In Caudill, a federal employee with breast cancer sought coverage
of a treatment called high dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplant support. See id. at
76. Her insurer denied coverage and she sought administrative review. After the OPM denied coverage,
she brought an action in North Carolina state court against her insurer. The insurer removed the action to
district court which denied a motion for remand and granted summary judgment for the insurer. Caudill
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. See id.
79. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). In Boyle, the Court found that in a dispute involving private parties,
“federal common law still may apply if the litigation would directly affect a federal interest.” Caudill, 999
F.2d at 78 (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507). Boyle requires that in order to apply federal common law there
must be a “significant conflict” between a “uniquely federal interest” and the application of state law. 487
U.S. at 507. While the Tenth Circuit decided Howard three years before the Supreme Court decided
Boyle, the Tenth Circuit continues to follow Howard despite Boyle. See Fields v. Farmers Ins. Co., 18
F.3d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Roux v. Lovelace Health Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1542
(D.N.M. 1996).
80. See Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78-79.
81. See id. at 78.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 78-79.
85. Id. at 79.
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delegated the authority to interpret health benefits contracts to OPM.”86
Therefore, the court found that removal jurisdiction existed.87 The court reached
this conclusion while specifically refusing to decide “whether the FEHBA
completely preempts state law claims.”88
The court, however, failed to ask whether the existence of the federal
contract issues were substantial enough to justify federal question removal
jurisdiction.89 Instead, the court simply relied on Boyle to hold that the “suit
involves a federal question because it arises from a federal contract, giving rise
to a uniquely federal interest so important that the ‘federal common law’
supplants state law either partially or entirely regardless of Congress’ intent to
preempt the area involved.”90
While the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Boyle was justified to reach its
conclusion that federal common law governs “[l]itigation regarding this
insurance contract,”91 Boyle does not support the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. Boyle was a diversity case in which federal jurisdiction was not an
issue.92 The Supreme Court only decided that the contract at issue in Boyle was
governed by federal common law. Boyle did not indicate that a finding that
federal common law governs the interpretation of the contract would justify the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction.93
Instead, the Fourth Circuit was left with a state cause of action for breach of
a contract governed by federal common law.94 The court failed to describe why
federal question jurisdiction over this state-federal hybrid case is justifiable in
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 77.
89. Had the insurance company raised federal contract issues in Caudill only as a defense to the
state action, Mottley would have foreclosed jurisdiction. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Instead, the plaintiff in Caudill was required to prove a state action for breach of a federal contract.
Because the contract was governed by federal law, the well-pleaded complaint necessarily raised issues of
federal law. This is necessary but not sufficient for federal jurisdiction under Merrell Dow. See supra
notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
90. Caudill, 999 F.2d at 77 (citing Boyle v. United Tech. Corp, 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)).
91. Id.
92. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
93. Such a finding would have required a careful refining of the Smith and Merrell Dow analysis.
Merrell Dow was decided only two years prior to Boyle, but the Court did not mention it at all. One can
only assume that the Court did not consider any of these jurisdictional issues as diversity jurisdiction was
uncontested.
94. While the court did say that federal common law would supplant state law either partially or
entirely, the court could not have meant to supplant the state cause of action as well. Such a move would
have required complete preemption analysis, something the court expressly refused to do. See Caudill,
999 F.2d at 77.
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light of Merrell Dow.95
In Goepel, the Third Circuit restricted its analysis to whether state claims for
the recovery of FEHB benefits are completely preempted by the FEHBA.96 T
court subscribed to the restrictive view of Merrell Dow, relying on a prior
circuit holding that the “only state claims that are ‘really’ federal claims and
thus removable to federal court are those that are preempted completely by
federal law.”97
The Third Circuit required the preemptive statute to contain both “civil
enforcement provisions within the scope of which the plaintiff’s state claim
falls” and “a clear indication of a congressional intention to permit removal
despite the plaintiff’s exclusive reliance on state law.”98 Th  court found that the
FEHBA does not authorize such a federal cause of action because the FEHBA
only provides for federal jurisdiction for claims against the United States.
Because the regulations promulgated by the OPM under the FEHBA at the time
Goepel was decided required an “action to recover on a claim for health benefits
should be brought against the carrier of the health benefits plan,”99 th  Third
Circuit concluded that the FEHBA does not completely preempt state law
claims for health benefits.100
The court, in finding that the FEHBA does not completely preempt
plaintiff’s state law cause of action, appeared to subscribe to Holmes’ theory
that an action only arises under the law that creates the cause of action.101
Because plaintiff alleged only state law causes of action, the court restricted its
95. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
96. 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994). The insurer in Goepel removed an action arising out of their denial
of coverage for a breast cancer treatment. See id. at 308-09. After the district court denied their motion to
remand and entered judgment for the insurer, the insured appealed on the ground that their claims were
based “exclusively on state law, and thus [did] not raise any ‘federal questions.’” Id. at 309. For a
discussion of the lower court decision, see Selected Recent Court Decisions, Health Insurance: Coverage
for Bone Marrow Transplants: Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 351 (1993).
97. Goepel, 36 F.3d at 311-12 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983); Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry., 858 F.2d 936,
942 (3d Cir. 1988)). Railway Labor reasoned that without a federal cause of action, the state claim could
not be recharacterized as a federal claim. Therefore, there would be no claim arising under federal law.
See Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942. This analysis ignores the underlying importance of congressional
intent and the practical judicial considerations at work in federal question jurisdiction analysis. See infra
notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
98. Goepel, 36 F.3d at 311 (citing Railway Labor, 858 F.2d at 942).
99. Id. at 312 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 890.107 (1994)). The OPM has since amended this regulation to
require such actions to be brought against the OPM and not the carriers. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
100. See Goepel, 36 F.3d at 313.
101. See supra note 54.
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analysis to whether the FEHBA provides a federal cause of action that
completely preempts the state cause of action.102 This a alysis ignores the
possibility of obtaining jurisdiction under a less restrictive view of Merrell Dow.
The discussion of federal question jurisdiction in these federal insurance
removal cases is not limited to the state-federal hybrid case analysis of Smith
and Merrell Dow. In fact, the court in Howard never even reached the issue due
to its finding that federal common law does not govern the interpretation of
FEHB contracts. For the moment, however, assume that federal common law
governs the interpretation of these contracts as the Fourth Circuit held in
Caudill. Further, assume that there is no federal cause of action to recover
under FEHB contracts and therefore no complete preemption as the Third
Circuit held in Goepel. What remains is a well-pleaded complaint alleging a
state law cause of action requiring resolution of federal law issues, that is, a
state-federal hybrid case. Based on these assumptions, which this Note later
contends are correct,103 federal question jurisdiction over the federal insurance
removal cases depends on a court’s interpretation of Merrell Dow.
IV. MERRELL DOW AND THE BROKEN COMPASS
Under the restrictive view of Merrell Dow, federal question jurisdiction
analysis is simple:104 the court should decide whether Congress intended there to
be a private, federal cause of action for violation of the federal law at issue. This
question is dispositive of jurisdiction and amounts to no more than the classic
Holmes’ formulation of federal question jurisdiction: a case arises under the law
that creates the cause of action.105
But there are several reasons to think that the Court in Merrell Dow did not
intend to completely abandon over a hundred years of federal question
jurisprudence and regress to the restrictive and inflexible Holmes’ formulation.
The most obvious sign is the Court’s repeated approval of jurisdictional
doctrines reflecting the need for a flexible and practical approach to federal
question jurisdiction.
First, the Court cited Smith with cautionary approval, thus recognizing that
102. Note that the complete preemption doctrine is completely consistent with Holmes’ theory. If the
federal cause of action completely preempts plaintiff’s state law cause of action, then plaintiff actually
pled a federal cause of action. Therefore, the case arises under federal law because federal law creates the
cause of action that plaintiff actually pled.
103. See infra Part V.
104. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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some state created causes of action, which necessarily turn on some
construction of federal law, may be entitled to federal jurisdiction.106The Court
then indicated that those circumstances depend substantially on practical and
“sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system.”107 Second, the Court discussed the jurisdiction in Smith as dependent
on the “nature of the federal interest at stake.”108 The issue in Smith was very
substantial: the “constitutionality of an important federal statute.”109
Ultimately, however, any understanding of Merrell Dow must somehow
come to terms with the Court’s strange use of the implied remedy doctrine. As
the Court noted, Merrell Dow represents the first time the Court used the four
factors of the implied remedy doctrine to analyze a jurisdictional claim.110 Other
than dismissing its surprising use as a by-product of its youth, the Court failed
to explain why its use is appropriate in this context.111 In fact, this failing is the
principal criticism of Merrell Dow.112 Commentators do not understand why the
106. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5 (1986). After citing the rule
from Smith, as stated in Franchise Tax Board, that “a case may arise under federal law ‘where the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law,’” Id. at 808,
the Court warned that “[o]ur actual holding in Franchise Tax Board demonstrates that this statement
must be read with caution.” Id. at 809.
107. Id. at 810. The Court also noted the need for flexibility when it quoted from Franchise Tax
Board: “There is no single, precise definition of that concept; rather, the phrase arising under masks a
welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the
federal judicial system.” Id. at 808 (quotations omitted). One could argue that the Court was merely
paying lip service to the old formulations, but this Note contends that the Court implicitly made these
practical judgments about federal standards cases and only performed implied remedy analysis to add
further support. See infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 814 n.12. The Court stated:
Several commentators have suggested that our § 1331 decisions can best be understood as an
evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake. . . .
Focusing on the nature of the federal interest, moreover, suggests that the widely perceived
“irreconcilable” conflict between the finding of jurisdiction in [Smith] and the finding of no jurisdiction in
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934), . . . is far from clear. For the difference in
results can be seen as manifestations of the differences in the nature of the federal issues at stake. In
Smith, as the Court emphasized, the issue was the constitutionality of an important federal statute. . . . In
Moore, in contrast, the Court emphasized that the violation of the federal standard as an element of state
tort recovery did not fundamentally change the state tort nature of the action. . . .
The importance of the nature of the federal issue in federal-question jurisdiction is highlighted by the
fact that, despite the usual reliability of the Holmes test as an inclusionary principle, this Court has
sometimes found that formally federal causes of action were not properly brought under federal-question
jurisdiction because of the overwhelming predominance of state-law issues.
Id. at 814 n.12.
109. Id. at 814 n.12. The statute at issue in Smith was the Federal Farm Loan Act. See Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195-98 (1921).
110. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811.
111. See id.
112. See supra note 9.
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Court used the implied remedy doctrine to analyze a jurisdiction claim. Most
commentators think that the Court simply confused the two doctrines.113
Merrell Dow’s citation of Professor Cohen’s article, The Broken Compass,
may explain the Court’s use of the implied remedy doctrine.114 After detailing
his famous proposal that federal question jurisdiction cases should be explicitly,
and already are implicitly, judged solely by pragmatic considerations, Professor
Cohen detailed certain classes of cases where particular jurisdiction tests work
but actually “obscure the pragmatic considerations which may govern [the]
decisions.”115
One such case is the “personal injury action where a federal law standard is
used to demonstrate that defendant’s conduct amounted to wrongdoing.”116
Professor Cohen acknowledged that federal question jurisdiction in these cases
routinely turns on Holmes’ analysis but argued that this technique can be
explained pragmatically.117 In short, he asserted that federal judges are unhappy
with the large number of personal injury diversity cases, that the need for an
expert federal forum to decide federal law issues is minimal, and that
jurisdiction over such cases would add significantly to the federal docket given
the “growing number of federal laws regulating individual conduct.”118 Finally,
he asserted that without “something more” federal courts should refuse to hear
these cases in light of the pragmatic considerations.119
Then, in a remarkable parallel to Merrell Dow, Professor Cohen asserted
that the “something more” could only be a federal cause of action, either explicit
or implicit, for the federal standard violation.120 A federal cause of action
supplies that “‘something more’ . . . in the sense that a decision that federal law
provides the cause of action represents a judgment by Congress, or by the
courts, of the necessity for a protective federal forum.”121
Although substantially truncated, the Court’s analysis in Merrell Dow has
essentially the same structural features as The Broken Compass. First, the
question presented described the “incorporation of a federal standard in a state-
113. See Redish, supra note 9, at 1790-91; Alleva, supra note 8, at 1543-51.
114. See Cohen, supra note 1. The Court cited The Broken Compass on page 814 in the well-known
footnote 12. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12.
115. Cohen, supra note 1, at 911-12.
116. Id. at 911.
117. See id. at 911-12.
118. Id. at 912.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
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law private action.”122 The action in Merrell Dow, a personal injury, products
liability action based on a violation of a federal standard, was exactly the same
as the class of cases described by Professor Cohen. Second, the Court
recognized that the claim presented a state-federal hybrid case.123 Third, the
Court described the use of practical considerations in the limitations over
jurisdiction of such cases.124 Fourth, the Court inquired into the existence of a
federal cause of action for federal standard violations.125 Finally, the Court
described the practical reasons why the absence of a federal remedy further
dictates against upholding federal jurisdiction over such cases.126
Most importantly, the reference to Professor Cohen’s article explains the
context of the Court’s decision to refer to the implied remedy doctrine. Without
the implied federal remedy, the Court did not have that “something more” with
which to overcome the practical presumption against federal question
jurisdiction in federal standard incorporation cases. Furthermore, the Court used
the implied remedy doctrine to strengthen the case against jurisdiction.127
This analysis of the reasoning in Merrell Dow demonstrates that the Court
was not using the existence of a federal remedy as the sole determinant of
federal question jurisdiction. Instead, the Court reaffirmed its pragmatic
approach to jurisdictional theory. Congressional intent to provide a federal
remedy is simply one more factor to consider in the federal question jurisdiction
analysis of state-federal hybrid claims.
Finally, the Court’s broad statement of its holding128 is co sistent with
Professor Cohen’s concern that courts should not decide jurisdictional questions
on a case-by-case basis:
It may be objected that recognition of the pragmatic nature of the
decision whether a claim arises directly under federal law will lead to an
ad hoc, unpredictable, case-by-case decision of jurisdictional questions.
It goes without saying that it is undesirable for jurisdictional rules to be
uncertain. . . .
. . . [But], the process is not simply case-by-case decision making,
with each case standing on its own bottom, but rather a process of
122. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805 (1986).
123. See id. at 809-10.
124. See id. at 810.
125. See id. at 810-11.
126. See id. at 811-12.
127. See id.
128. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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clarifying jurisdictional uncertainty in classes of cases before the
court.129
Merrell Dow also noted a concern that jurisdictional decisions not be made on a
case-by-case basis:
“[T]he interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper
management of the federal judicial system,” would be ill served by a rule
that made the existence of federal-question jurisdiction depend on the
district court’s case-by-case appraisal of the novelty of the federal
question asserted as an element of the state tort.130
The Court’s broad holding, then, is properly seen as an attempt to make its
jurisdiction decision applicable to a broad class of cases and not as a dramatic
retrenchment to the restrictive Holmes’ analysis.
Pragmatic considerations should form the crux of the jurisdictional analysis
in state-federal hybrid claims. These considerations amount to basic concerns
about our federal system of government. An extremely important federal interest
will suffice.131 Additionally, the courts should weigh the relative efficiencies of
original versus appellate jurisdiction in protecting the federal interest, the
necessity for a forum with expertise in federal law, and the potential for state
court hostility against the enforcement of federal rights.132 Furthermore, concern
is warranted over the potential for overwhelming the federal docket if courts
obtain original jurisdiction over a class of claims.133Conversely, if the cases do
not involve actual contested issues of federal law, then state court jurisdiction is
probably adequate. Finally, an indication of congressional intent, if not a clear
statement, that the federal courts should take jurisdiction over a state cause of
129. Cohen, supra note 1, at 908 (emphasis added).
130. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)).
131. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
132. This assessment raises many practical and sensitive concerns about our federal system of
government. Many of these concerns closely parallel the reasons practitioners purport to remove cases to
federal court. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. A weighing of the need for original versus
appellate jurisdiction is likely to be influenced by several factors including: (1) the likelihood of state
court hostility toward the application of federal law in this area; (2) the perception that federal court
precedent is needed sooner rather than later to establish more uniform standards of conduct for health
insurers; and (3) the nature and number of these claims and their likelihood of clogging the federal docket.
See Cohen, supra note 1.
133. This concern essentially amounts to an assessment of the number of potential FEHB contract
claims. Given the federal court’s experience with the large volume of federal ERISA claims, the courts are
probably much more hesitant to recognize jurisdiction over similar claims.
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action will generally override any presumption against jurisdiction.134
V. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION FOR THE FEDERAL INSURANCE
REMOVAL CLAIMS
When federal employees bring coverage claims, they generally do not allege
that the insurance company violated the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act
and that they have a federal cause of action to remedy that violation.135 Without
this allegation in the complaint, federal question removal jurisdiction is not
obtainable under the traditional Holmes’ analysis because the well-pleaded
complaint rule forbids it.136
Instead, plaintiffs generally bring state law causes of action such as breach
of contract or bad faith refusal to pay an insurance claim,137 an e ement of
which is necessarily a breach of the FEHB contract.138 Whether these state
134. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
135. Analysis of FEHB contract claims removed to federal district courts reveals a variety of state
law actions. For breach of contract claims, see Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d
306, 308 (3d Cir. 1994); Howard v. Group Hospital Service, 739 F.2d 1508, 1508 (10th Cir. 1984);
Hanson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 953 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Transitional Hospital
Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 924 F. Supp. 67, 68 (W.D. Tex. 1996); Williams v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 827 F. Supp. 1228, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1993); Lieberman v. National Postal Mail Handlers
Union, 819 F. Supp. 344, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Grazel v. Nazari, No. 92-CV-1471, 1992 WL 122913,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1992); Furey v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, No. 91-1072, 1991 WL 206761, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1991); Mooney v. Blue Cross, 678 F. Supp. 565, 567 (W.D. Pa. 1988). For bad faith
refusal to pay claims, see Howard, 739 F.2d at 1508; Hanson, 953 F. Supp. at 275; Lambert v. Mail
Handlers Benefit Plan, 886 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Ala. 1995); Williams, 827 F. Supp. at 1229; Furey,
1991 WL 206761, at *1; Ochsner Foundation Hospital v. Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Co.,
No. 88-5028, 1989 WL 6013, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 1989). For state unfair trade practice claims, see
Goepel, 36 F.3d at 308; Arnold v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 973 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Furey, 1991 WL 206761, at *1. For declaratory judgment actions, see Roux v. Lovelace Health Systems,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (D.N.M. 1996); Rocky Mountain Hospital & Medical Services v.
Phillips, 835 F. Supp. 575, 576 (D. Colo. 1993); Hirsch v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. MJG-90-
3049, 1991 WL 502004, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 26, 1991). Although the declaratory judgment actions are
brought under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, this federal law is merely procedural and does not
create a federal cause of action. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 15-19 (1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950); Ronald J.
Mann, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Preemption Claims: A Post-Franchise Tax Board Analysis, 62
TEX. L. REV. 893, 899-900 (1984).
136. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 135.
138. That a complaint alleging that an insurer breached the terms of the plaintiff’s insurance coverage
is sufficient to establish that the plaintiff’s right to recovery depends on interpretation of the insurance
contract is beyond question. But without a statement in the complaint that the contract at issue is a FEHB
contract, the complaint does not literally show that plaintiff’s right to recovery depends on the
interpretation of a federal contract. For the purposes of this analysis, this Note assumes that all such
complaints either plead breach of a FEHB contract or that failing to do so constitutes artful pleading. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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claims are actually artfully pled federal causes of action and removable to
federal court depends on whether the FEHBA completely preempts these state
law causes of action.
The FEHBA, as it existed at the time of Goepel, did not completely preempt
state causes of action for denial of coverage.139 First, FEHBA preemption,
unlike ERISA preemption, is relatively narrow. The FEHBA only allows the
preemption of law related “to the nature and extent of coverage or benefits.”140
There is no indication of congressional intent to preempt state law remedies.
Second, while the regulations in effect at the time recognized that an enrollee
could bring an “action to recover on a claim for health benefits . . . against the
carrier of the health benefits plan,”141 the FEHBA only provided federal
jurisdiction for claims against the United States.142 This combination
simultaneously recognized that such actions would be brought against carriers
but specifically precluded them from the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts.143 Because federal causes of action are within the statutory grant of
federal question jurisdiction,144 this combination seems to foreclose the
possibility of a federal cause of action against the carrier. Therefore, the state
cause of action cannot really be a federal cause of action, and the FEHBA does
not completely preempt state coverage claims.145
Whether FEHB contract claims are removable to federal court under state-
federal hybrid case analysis is a complicated question. First, as both Howard
139. This section essentially parallels the analysis of the Third Circuit. See generally Goepel v.
National Postal Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 8901(m)(1) (1994).
141. 5 C.F.R. § 890.107 (1994).
142. See 5 U.S.C. § 8912 (1994).
143. OPM regulations at the time of Goepel specifically recognized that coverage actions would be
brought but provided no indication that the actions would be federal in nature. While the regulations
recognizing that claims for health benefits “should be brought against the carrier, not against OPM,” 5
C.F.R. § 890.107 (1994), were simply “regulations necessary to carry out,” 5 U.S.C. § 8913 (1994), the
provisions of the FEHBA and not necessarily an indication of congressional intent, federal courts
generally defer to an agency’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. See Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
145. Perhaps a simpler analysis would focus on the congressional intent not to provide jurisdiction to
claims against FEHB carriers. This analysis would fall squarely under the language of Justice Brennan’s
concurrence in Taylor: “removal jurisdiction exists when, as here, ‘Congress has clearly manifested an
intent to make causes of action . . . removable to federal court.’” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481 U.S. 58, 67-68 (1987). This analysis avoids the Third Circuit’s forced interpretation of Franchise
Tax Board that requires a federal cause of action to exist regardless of congressional intent to provide
removal jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit analyzes complete preemption cases almost entirely through
indications of congressional intent, the existence of a federal cause of action being just one factor. See
Deford v. Soo Line Ry., 867 F.2d 1080, 1086 (8th Cir. 1989).
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and Caudill recognized, the interpretation of FEHB contracts must be governed
by federal law in order for there even to be any federal law at issue in the well-
pleaded complaint of the state cause of action. Second, assuming federal
common law governs the interpretation of FEHB contracts, whether federal
question jurisdiction is appropriate for the state-federal hybrid claims ultimately
depends on a court’s interpretation of Merrell Dow.
The conflict between Howard and Caudill over the law governing
interpretation of the FEHB contracts seems largely due to the failure of the
Tenth Circuit to recognize the federal interests that Congress intended to protect
when it enacted the FEHBA’s preemption clause.146 Congress was so concerned
with lack of uniformity resulting from the use of state law in interpreting the
contracts that it responded with preemption legislation.147 Furthermore, in
enacting the legislation, Congress explicitly acknowledged its extensive federal
interests. Besides uniformity and efficiency, Congress recognized that
preventing the application of state law to the interpretation of FEHB contracts
“should result in a reduction of cost to the Federal Government and the
employees.”148
Finally, as the Fourth Circuit noted, the Federal Government’s interest in
ensuring uniformity in its “rights and duties” under FEHB contracts149 seems
much stronger than the interests at stake in Boyle.150 The health of every federal
146. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that federal law would apply only “if diverse resolutions of a
controversy would frustrate the operations of a federal program, conflict with a specific national policy, or
have some direct effect on the United States or its treasury.” Howard, 739 F.2d at 1510-11 (citations and
footnote omitted). This statement was essentially correct at the time. See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433
U.S. 25 (1977); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). But Congress specifically passed the preemption provision to
prevent diverse decisions in state courts from frustrating the uniform operation of the FEHB program. See
supra note 55. Furthermore, the Civil Service Commission recommended the preemption provision to
Congress to avoid the “time consuming and costly litigation” thought necessary to establish the
application of federal law to FEHB contracts. S. REP. NO. 95-903, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415. Finally, the application of state law to the interpretation of FEHB contracts
presents courts with an interpretative paradox. See infra note 147. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit failed
to mention the preemption provision in its decision in Howard. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision
four years later in Boyle makes it clear that federal common law should govern the interpretation of these
federal contracts. See supra note 79.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1) (1994); supra note 55. In fact, the clause itself provides a strong
argument against the use of state law in the interpretation of FEHB contracts. The application of state law
to the interpretation of contractual provisions having the preemptive power to displace those very state
laws presents a paradox. Courts must decide what a contractual clause means before they can decide
whether it conflicts with state law. It would be entirely anomalous to have state law govern the preemptive
effect of federal contractual provisions.
148. S. REP. NO. 95-903, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415.
149. See Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 999 F.2d 74, 78 (4th Cir. 1993).
150. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-13 (1988); Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78-79.
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government employee is a uniquely federal interest of paramount importance. In
fact, the health of government employees implicates the very same interest at
stake in Boyle: the “interest in getting the Government’s work done.”151
The uniquely federal interests at stake in the interpretation of FEHB
contracts also significantly conflict with the application of state law. In fact,
Congress explicitly recognized this conflict when it amended the FEHBA to
preempt state laws which relate to the nature or extent of benefits or
coverage.152 Application of state law to FEHB contracts that have national
scope would significantly alter the uniformity of benefits that Congress intended
to provide to federal employees. Given the uniquely federal interests at stake in
the uniform interpretation of FEHB contracts and the significant conflict that
would arise if courts attempted to apply state insurance laws, it seems clear that
federal common law must govern the interpretation of FEHB contracts.153
It is not enough that federal law is at issue in the well-pleaded complaint,
however. The federal law issues must be substantial enough to merit original
federal jurisdiction. The question of substantiality requires sensitive judgments
and a pragmatic consideration about the nature of the federal interests at stake,
indications of congressional intent to provide jurisdiction, and the possible
effects original jurisdiction would have on federal court burdens.154
At the outset, FEHB contract claims should be placed in proper perspective.
A court should not decide whether federal question jurisdiction should obtain
over a particular FEHB contract claim merely on the facts of the particular
case. Instead, the court should make judgments about the class of cases within
which the FEHB contract claim belongs.155 As in Merrell Dow, the class of
claims should be defined quite broadly.156 One might define the class as those
cases in which a party brings a state cause of action, either sounding in contract
or tort, over a federal contract.
First, it should be clear that these cases do not merely allege a violation of a
federal standard as in Merrell Dow. Instead, these cases allege state actions for
which the key issues hinge upon the interpretation of a contract under federal
common law. Therefore, Merrell Dow does not create a presumption against
federal question jurisdiction.
151. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505.
152. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
153. This reasoning essentially parallels that of the Fourth Circuit. See Caudill, 999 F.2d at 78-79.
154. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text
155. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
156. See id.
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Conversely, the questions of federal law presented in federal contract claims
certainly do not rise to the level of substantiality present in Smith.157 Most of
these claims simply amount to an interpretation of the federal contract, not the
“constitutionality of an important federal statute.”158 As th  discussion above
indicates, however, the federal interests at stake are significant.159 In the general
class of federal contract claims, there is a strong federal interest in the uniform
interpretation of these contracts and usually a more particular federal interest
regarding the subject matter of the contract. For example, in the context of
FEHB contract claims, the federal interests are in the uniform and efficient
provision of health benefits to federal employees responsible for getting the
government’s work done. These federal interests seem much more important
than the interests at stake in Merrell Dow.160 Federal contract cases raise federal
law issues somewhere in between the importance of the issues raised in Smith
and Merrell Dow.
In terms of federal docket management, upholding original jurisdiction in
this case would not subject the federal courts to the kind of overwhelming
burden possible in Merrell Dow. The universe of possible plaintiffs here is
limited to parties to or beneficiaries of federal contracts, while the number of
possible plaintiffs who could sue for FDCA violations seems unlimited.161
The application of federal common law to these federal contracts also
highlights the need for a federal forum. State court judges, accustomed to
157. The issue in Smith was the constitutionality of an important federal statute. See Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195 (1921).
158. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986).
159. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
160. The federal interest at stake in Merrell Dow was the protection of consumers from misleading
and perhaps dangerous pharmaceutical labeling. Congress seemed to envision the protection of that
interest through government regulatory programs not private federal action, however.
One could argue that, in fact, there is no federal interest at stake in incorporation cases like Merrell
Dow.
When a state, rather than having anything turn on the reach of federal law, has merely incorporated the
standard contained in a federal law by analogy, the bases for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction
disappear. If, for example, a state has enacted an antitrust statute, to apply only to intrastate commerce,
which provides that any violation of federal antitrust law will constitute a violation of state law as well,
the federal courts have no legitimate interest in the state law’s interpretation. While the state courts may
incorrectly construe federal law, that is of concern only to the state itself. Since by hypothesis there has
been no effect on interstate commerce, no federal interest of any kind has been implicated.
MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 67-68
(1980).
161. The number of product liability actions brought each year regarding products subject to the
FDCA is undoubtedly enormous. The FDCA regulates products used by almost every citizen of the United
States. On the other hand, FEHB contracts only cover approximately nine million federal employees. Out
of that relatively small pool, only a handful have brought suit for denial of health insurance benefits.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/6
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applying their generally consumer friendly state contract and tort law, may be
hostile to a federal contractor’s attempt to enforce their federal rights.
Additionally, these cases will almost always involve actual contested issues of
federal law. Contract claims necessarily involve the interpretation of the
contracts. The synthesis and application of federal common law to these
contracts is a process best suited for federal judges with an expertise in federal
law.
Although there is no indication that Congress intended to provide federal
question jurisdiction for these cases, that is not fatal here. All of the other
factors point to strong pragmatic reasons for federal question jurisdiction over
these claims. A federal remedy is not needed here to overcome a presumption
against federal jurisdiction as it was in Merrell Dow. Based on the significance
of the federal interests at stake, the predominance of federal law issues requiring
the expertise of a federal forum and the limited potential impact on the federal
docket, federal contract cases, including the federal insurance removal cases,
should warrant federal question jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION
A restrictive view of Merrell Dow prevents courts from obtaining federal
question jurisdiction over state-federal hybrid cases for which there are
important federal interests at stake and good pragmatic reasons for allowing
jurisdiction. When read in conjunction with Professor Cohen’s article, The
Broken Compass, the more flexible and pragmatic structure of Merrell Dow is
revealed. Such a framework makes it clear that courts should abandon the
search for “a single, all-purpose, neutral analytical concept.”162 Jurisdictional
decisions in state-federal hybrid cases should be made from a pragmatic
perspective. Under this framework, federal question jurisdiction is appropriate
for the federal insurance removal cases and federal contract cases in general.
Kenneth Lee Marshall
162. Cohen, supra note 1, at 907.
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